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Manufacturing Resilience on the Margins:  
Street Gangs, Property, & Vulnerability 
Theory 
Lua Kamál Yuille* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Within law, contemporary street gangs are cast as corporatized 
criminal enterprises, whose primary goal is the acquisition of illicit 
economic capital. The sophistication of corporate gangs has led to the 
development of novel control mechanisms like gang injunctions, which 
are civil legal remedies employed to disperse unwanted gang activity from 
protected communities. This article suggests that the idea of property—
and the vulnerability associated therewith—is central to understanding 
gangs. Accepting the well-established proposition that gangs arise due to 
the unavailability or inaccessibility of markets for mainstream and 
legitimized forms of capital, this article argues that gangs are best 
understood as corporate institutions engaged in the sustained, 
transgressive creation of alternative markets for the development of the 
types of property interests that scholars have associated with the 
development and pursuit of identity and “personhood.” That is, gangs are 
mechanisms through which networked vulnerable subjects seek to create 
resilience in each other. 
The particular vulnerabilities to which gang members are least 
resilient have been clearly identified and thoroughly explored in 
sociological literature. Nonetheless, the criminological framing of gangs 
as creators rather than subjects of vulnerability within already 
marginalized communities has prevented widespread implementation or 
 
*Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. Various drafts and pieces of 
this article, benefitted from the comments and reactions of participants in the 7th Annual 
Meeting of the Association of Law, Property, and Society (ALPS), a Workshop on 
Vulnerability and Social Justice, Property Works-in-Progress 2016, and the inaugural 
Margaret E. Montoya Scholarship Retreat (including the inestimable Margaret E. Montoya, 
herself). Thanks to F. E. Guerra-Pujol and my research assistants, Kelsey Treuil and 
Elizabeth D. Williams. I also thank the actual and imputed gang members, whose 
experiences motivated this line of work and who graciously participated in my empirical 
research study that significantly influenced this theoretical work. I bear, of course, all 
responsibility for any deficiencies. FTJ. JGY. 
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political consideration these realities. Instead, anti-gang strategies 
eliminate resilience to which gangs and their members have access by 
imposing a presumption of criminality on individuals believed to be 
associated with gangs and destabilize the sources of resilience available to 
people and institutions proximal to gangs. 
Using the reimagined potential for government action and 
responsibility that vulnerability theory permits, this article suggests that 
local governments should compensate gang members for refraining from 
certain gang conduct. This approach, which has seen success when 
implemented by private and government actors (both in the gang and other 
contexts), offers a potentially effective response to gang member 
vulnerability—i.e. fostering resilience—that is responsive to the social 
justice, economic, and political considerations that gangs present. 
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“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long 
time. . . takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your 
resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.” 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes1 
 
PROLOGUE 
At Homeboy Industries, a forty-nine-year-old lifetime gangbanger 
whose skin and tattoos have begun to sag walks into Greg’s office and 
announces, “I don’t have an identity . . . . I need help.” He is followed 
by a sixteen-year-old member of Tortilla Flats—David Escobar—who 
has been in four probation camps since he was eleven years old. 
“Can you hang here, son?” Greg Boyle asks. 
“Everyone in Compton is my enemy,” David answers. 
“Yeah, but here everyone is your friend, no one is your enemy, and 
that includes people from all the neighborhoods in Compton.” 
“You mean—I would work here with enemies?” 
“No hanging, no banging, no slanging. And you get a job here and 
services—you get a life. Can you hang here, son?” 
David looks at Greg—angry, frightened, defensive, alone.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pages that follow advance a simple central proposition: Local 
governments should pay gang members to refrain from gang activity. But 
the deeper story this article tells is more complex, with implications far 
beyond the relatively confined world of the contemporary American street 
gang inhabited by an estimated 850,000 members.3 That more complex 
story is of the universal human condition of vulnerability, the instinct and 
imperative to build mechanisms to confront that vulnerability, and of 
property’s important role in that task. 
 
 1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). 
 2. JORJA LEAP, JUMPED IN: WHAT GANGS TAUGHT ME ABOUT VIOLENCE, DRUGS, 
LOVE, AND REDEMPTION 216 (2012). 
 3. This figure constitutes less than one-half of one percent of Americans. See Arlen 
Egley Jr. et al., Juvenile Justice Fact Sheet: Highlights of the 2012 National Youth gang 
Survey, U.S. OFFICE OF JUV. JUSTICE & DELINQ. PREVENTION 1 (Dec. 2014), 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248025.pdf; cf. NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR., NATIONAL GANG 
REPORT iii (2013) https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-national-
gang-report-2013/view [hereinafter 2013 NATIONAL GANG REPORT] (declining to estimate 
the number of gang members in the US because of both “inconclusive reporting” and “lack 
of confidence in estimates collected”). 
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The surface story of this article offers a provocative and unexpected 
approach to what is framed as a growing national, regional, and local gang 
threat.4 More predictable, is the response of local governments and law 
enforcement agencies, which have developed creative initiatives to disrupt 
and dismantle the reported 33,000 gangs across the country.5 Most of this 
experimentation has focused on variations on traditional policing, like the 
creation of specialized “gang units” within police departments and 
targeted heightened surveillance operations against gang leaders.6 
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, political actors also turned to civil legal 
mechanisms to combat what continues to be framed as the growing, 
intractable menace of the corporatized, terroristic, criminal street gang.7 
The wholly criminal image of street gangs reflected in the punitive 
(and criminalizing) orientation of anti-gang legal mechanisms, like gang 
injunctions, is myopic and fatally flawed. Street gangs and their 
constituent members often do engage in unlawful and criminal conduct.8 
However, the consensus across the varied fields engaged in gang research 
is that the purpose of the contemporary gangs is not the commission of 
crime.9 Rather, violence and criminality are secondary or tertiary 
characteristics of gangs, necessitated by the inaccessibility of mainstream 
markets and the legal mechanisms that create, structure, and regulate those 
markets.10 Properly understood, street gangs are social institutions creating 
and operating in alternative markets for the kinds of social and financial 
capital that provides resilience to the universal vulnerability concomitant 
with the human condition and which is inaccessible to them through 
 
 4. See NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR., NATIONAL GANG REPORT (2015) 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-national-gang-report-
2015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 NATIONAL GANG REPORT]. 
 5. Gangs, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/gangs (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).  
 6. See generally THE MODERN GANG READER § 5 (Arlen Egley Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2006) (discussing various public programs and policies used to address gang-related 
problems).  
 7. EDWARD L. ALLAN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF POLICING BY INJUNCTION 63–65 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams 
III eds., 2004) (ebook).  
 8. See, e.g., David C. Pyrooz, From Colors and Guns to Caps and Gowns? The 
Effects of Gang Membership on Educational Attainment, 51 J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 
56, 57 (2014) (summarizing current research concluding the same). 
 9. Brenda C. Coughlin & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Urban Street Gang After 
1970, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 41, 44 (2003) (“the consensus appears to be that drug 
trafficking is usually a secondary interest compared to identity construction, protecting 
neighborhood territory, and recreation,” treated herein as central characteristics of 
property’s resilience functions). But see GEORGE W. KNOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO GANGS 
636 (6th ed. 2006) (“Recall that a gang is a gang if and only if it engages in law violation 
behavior, either individually or collectively.”). 
 10. This same idea has been explored in depth with respect to pirates. See generally 
PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES (2009). 
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traditional, sanctioned avenues for the production of resilience-generating 
capital. This factual reorientation does not make street gangs any less 
objectionable, but it does suggest that a just approach to gangs must reflect 
this reality. 
This article provides the foundation for one such approach, offering 
a novel solution to the problems purportedly addressed by traditional 
regulation of gangs. A more nuanced rendition of the policy suggestion 
rudimentarily introduced above is this: Local governments should 
compensate gang members for refraining from certain, otherwise lawful, 
gang activity. 
This gang compensation idea has both descriptive and prescriptive 
foundations, drawing on property theory and the vulnerability thesis. Parts 
II through IV set forth the descriptive claim of the article: Gangs are about 
not crime, but the resilience to vulnerability that property affords people. 
A key function of the contemporary gang is the creation, use, and 
control of property.11 Gangs control territory;12 they communicate through 
the use of clothing and other heraldic devices;13 they create intangible 
assets on which they trade.14 These kinds of property are not merely 
income generators. Rather, they are connected to and necessary for human 
identity. This special category of “identity property” is uniquely situated 
to allow individuals to respond to, compensate for, adapt to, and even 
capitalize upon their vulnerability. That is, gangs are networked 
institutions of resilience that arise within an alternative market, where 
mainstream institutions and systems have failed to provide opportunities 
to create enough identity property to adequately inure gang members and 
their communities to their vulnerability. That insight frees anti-gang 
strategies from the confines of the criminal law and criminal law proxies 
and exposes social justice considerations not normally associated with 
gang regulation.15 
Vulnerability theory is central to this reinterpretation of gangs. 
Vulnerability theory depathologizes vulnerability, recognizing that it is a 
universal, constant characteristic of humans and their institutions. 
Drawing on this insight, vulnerability theory—a rapidly developing 
 
 11. Lua Kamál Yuille, Blood In, Buyout: A Property & Economic Approach to Street 
Gangs, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1119–1121 (2015).  
 12. See Olivier Bangerter, Territorial Gangs and Their Consequences for 
Humanitarian Players, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 387, 396–97 (2010).  
 13. See KNOX, supra note 9, at 35–36; see also ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN & DONALD W. 
KODLUBOY, GANGS IN SCHOOLS: SIGNS, SYMBOLS AND SOLUTIONS 33–34, 46 (1998).  
 14. James A. Densley, Under the Hood: The Mechanics of London’s Street Gangs 
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, St. Antony’s College) (on file with author) (“Gang 
value is based entirely on intangible assets, or what is known as ‘intellectual property’ in 
legitimate markets.”). 
 15. Social justice considerations are central to the discourse on gang prevention.  
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heuristic for addressing pressing socio-legal concerns—permits a deeper 
and more authentic understanding of how people engage with each other 
and their communities. It confronts “the reality that we all live and die 
within a fragile materiality that renders us constantly susceptible to both 
internal and external forces beyond our control” in order to demand what 
the theory’s intellectual shepherd, Martha Albertson Fineman, calls the 
“responsive state.” This responsive state is responsible for creating and 
supporting structures and avenues of resilience—i.e. those resources that 
allow individuals to confront, adapt to, ameliorate the consequences of, 
compensate for, or contain the universal human condition. 
Building on that descriptive base, Part V of this article suggests that 
legal mechanisms that approach gangs as inescapably criminal are likely 
to be ineffective. Gangs are recreating a traditional market-based identity 
property, so the approach to the problems associated with them should 
reflect that orientation. In the market that gangs mirror, actors are paid to 
induce desired behavior. Such financial capital, and market institutions 
themselves, constitute an “essential but incomplete antidote”16 to inherent 
personal and institutional vulnerability.17 That is, they are a means for 
individuals to “recover from harm or setbacks”—they provide resilience 
to the vulnerability—all people face. A gang compensation strategy 
replicates this market outcome in the gang context and could form part of 
a comprehensive attack on gangs that is equally responsive to the crime 
control imperative as it is to broad social justice concerns. 
II.  STREET GANGS IN POPULAR LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
The consensus appears to be that street gangs, defined narrowly,18 are 
intractably pathological. The Federal Bureau of Investigation proclaims, 
“[t]hey poison our streets with drugs, violence, and all manner of crime.”19 
 
 16. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. 
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 320 n.73 (2014) [hereinafter Fineman, LGBT Youth]. 
 17. Id. (defining “resilience” as “the ability to become strong, healthy, or successful 
again after something bad happens.”). 
 18. As has been my practice in previous work, this article limits its discussion to 
contemporary, U.S.-based, street gangs for definitional, conceptual, and practical reasons. 
While comparisons may be made among street gangs discussed here and U.S. prison gangs, 
domestic and international organized criminal organizations (i.e. the mafia), and other 
international and transnational gangs, those variations remain beyond the scope of the 
present analysis. This distinction is consistent with the practice of a range of gang 
observers. See, 2013 NATIONAL GANG REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8 (distinguishing among 
street gangs, prison gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and other gangs by definition); see 
also 2015 NATIONAL GANG REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-28 (treating separately street gangs, 
prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs). 
 19. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 3. 
 2019 MANUFACTURING RESILIENCE ON THE MARGINS 469 
Gang members are “brutal outlaws,”20 complexly organized and deftly 
managed to plague the moral, culture, and financial foundations of their 
communities and threaten the futures of its children. Pronouncements 
against gangs are stark: “Few people can truly grasp the lifestyle residents 
of gang-dominated neighborhoods . . . must endure.”21 “The people of this 
community are prisoners in their own homes . . . . The area is an urban war 
zone.”22 “Residents kept their children locked indoors. Loud music, foul 
language, and gunfire echoed in the streets. Sidewalks and garage doors 
doubled as urinals. And citizens risked violent retaliation from gang 
members if they complained to police about rampant drug dealing, 
vandalism, and harassment.”23 “This is the same street gang that has 
caused residents to remain indoors, to not allow their children to play 
outdoors, and has prevented relatives from visiting.”24 “The United States 
spends $20 billion a year treating the victims of gunshot wounds. ‘Gang 
violence is not only tearing at our moral culture and killing our children, 
it’s also picking our pockets.’”25 
According to these accounts, gang members are terrorists. However, 
this reflexive condemnation, should be understood in relation to the 
ontological settlements that dominate and motivate the legal system. 
A. The Liberal Legal Subject 
An atomistic conception of the rational, autonomous, liberal subject 
dominates legal frameworks, generally and with respect to the 
management of social deviance. “Western systems of law and justice have 
inherited a political perspective that imagines a ‘liberal legal subject’ as 
the ideal citizen—this subject is an autonomous, independent, and fully-
functioning adult, who inhabits a world defined by individual, no societal 
responsibility, where state intervention or regulation is perceived as a 
violation of his liberty.”26 The liberal subject offers an image of the 
 
 20. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., FALSE PREMISE, FALSE PROMISE: THE 
BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 (May 1997), 
http://bit.ly/2Ethku9 (quoting then-Los Angeles City Attorney Hahn). 
 21. Keasa Hollister, Individual Autonomy Versus Community: Is It All or Nothing? An 
Analysis of City of Chicago v. Morales, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 221, 254 (2000). 
 22. Arleen Jacobius, Court Approves Gang Injunctions, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 34, 
34. 
 23. Julie Gannon Shoop, Gang Warfare: Legal Battle Pits Personal Liberty Against 
Public Safety, TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 12, 12.  
 24. Philip Lee, Chapter 34: Hitting Criminal Street Gangs Where It Hurts—Their 
Wallets, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 577, 577 (2008). 
 25. Silvia Perez, Alternatives in Fighting Street Gangs: Criminal Anti-Gang 
Ordinances v. Public Nuisance Laws, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 619, 619 (2001). 
 26. Martha Albertson Fineman, Introducing Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY AND 
THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK 1, 3 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Jonathan W. 
Fineman eds., 2018) [hereinafter Fineman, Introducing Vulnerability].  
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individual as fungorum more, sprung from the earth fully mature, 
autonomous, self-sufficient, free, and independent.27 This ontological 
commitment, essentially, presumes that each individual is born, raised, 
and lives within the same empowering circumstances. This liberal subject 
has individual legal rights and can use these rights to address inequality 
and wrongs through the legal system. 
When law “solicits the individual as the only relevant and wholly 
accountable actor,”28 it is imperative that he be held responsible for his 
own welfare. The “responsibilization” concomitant with the conception of 
the liberal subject expects individuals take care of themselves, not depend 
on the state to do so. Dependency—howsoever framed—is, therefore, 
perceived as individual failure.29 The state’s role is limited to ensuring that 
everyone is treated the same, in accordance with a formal vision of 
equality. Indeed, “no public institution has to assist those who failed to 
privately help themselves.”30 
The liberal subject, spawned from an indelibly raced and gendered 
socio-legal-economic milieu, is itself built in the image of an idealized, 
unrealistic—mythological even—white male.31 Notwithstanding its 
empirical falsity, the identification of the liberal subject with whitness and 
maleness means that the ontological space in which the liberal subject is 
presumptively situated is white and male. Thus, the proper role of the state 
reflects primarily the realities, concerns, and values that exist within that 
space.32 
 
 27. In his well-known mushroom simile, the influential English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes ideates socio-political institutions by “consider[ing] men as if even now [they] 
sprung up out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without 
all kind of engagement to each other.” THOMAS HOBBES, PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS 
CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY (1651), reprinted in 2 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF 
THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 1, 109 (William Molesworth ed., 1841).  
 28. WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 
133 (2015) (ebook).  
 29. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY 31–34 (2005) [hereinafter FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH]. 
 30. Hila Keren, Economizing Vulnerability: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 7 (2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  
 31. See Alexandria Timmer, A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court 
of Human Rights, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR 
LAW AND POLITICS 147, 149–50 (Martha Alberston Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013); see 
also Lourdes Peroni & Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an 
Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
1056, 1060 (2013).  
 32. The, often complementary, fields of critical race theory and feminist legal theory 
provide expansive explorations of precisely the ways in which the legal system is raced 
and gendered. The ways the liberal subject is also heteronormative, cis-normative, 
secularly Christian, and bourgeois classed is far beyond the scope of the present discussion 
is. For more on race and gender informed approaches to legal and socio-political analysis, 
see generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
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B. The Pathological Gang Subject 
Juxtaposed with the liberal subject, contemporary street gangs and 
their members are inevitably characterized within popular legal 
consciousness as intractably pathological. 
The terroristic, modern image of the corporatized, mature, and 
criminal street gang emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Preceding this 
period, a complex and contested range of factors—notably alienation from 
traditional labor markets that contracted then disappeared via 
deindustrialization33—distorted established gang attrition patterns 
associated with the end of adolescence.34 Facing sticky membership that 
lacked economic opportunity, gangs evolved to meld entrepreneurial 
exploits with the traditionally fraternal functions of the gang. By the 
1990s, they were seen as networked organizations that demonstrated 
significant geographic mobilization; increasingly engaged in lethal gun 
violence; and relied on non-hierarchical, decentralized, and competitive 
profit-driven enterprises.35 
Today emblematized by the Crips and Bloods, originating in Los 
Angeles, or the Latin Kings and Vice Lords, born in Chicago,36 these 
“persistent”37 gangs are, moreover, comprised predominately of members 
 
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012) (introducing the key concepts and methodology of critical 
race theory); FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, 
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS (Martha Alberston Fineman et al. eds., 2009) 
(anthologizing contemporary legal debates within, among, and across feminist and queer 
theorists); AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991) (an early interdisciplinary exploration of 
the ways law impacts the construction of women’s roles, identities, and rights); Franciciso 
Valdes, Legal Reform and Social Justice – An Introduction to LatCrit Theory, Praxis and 
Community, GRIFFITH L. REV. (2005) (providing an overview of a praxis centered approach 
to race inflected scholarship). 
 33.  See, e.g., Josh Sides, Straight into Compton: American Dreams, Urban 
Nightmares, and the Metamorphosis of a Black Suburb, 56 AM. Q. 583, 593–94 (2004).  
 34. John M. Hagedorn, Gangs in Late Modernity, in GANGS IN THE GLOBAL CITY: 
ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL CRIMINOLOGY 295, 301–05 (John M. Hagedorn ed., 2007).  
 35. See John M. Hagedorn, Race Not Space: A Revisionist History of Gangs in 
Chicago, 91(2) J. OF AFR. AM. HIST. 194–208 (2006) [Hagedorn, Race Not Space].  
 36. For a description of these gangs, see for example, ALENJANDRO A. ALONSO, 
TERRITORIALITY AMONG AFRICAN AMERICAN STREET GANGS IN LOS ANGELES (1999) 
(published M.A. thesis, University of Southern California, UMI No. 1395119); R. D. 
Flores, Crips and Bloods, 13 CRIME & JUSTICE INT’L 6, 6–9 (1997).  
 37. Frederic Thrasher inaugurated the scientific study of gangs with The Gang: A 
Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago, his 1919–1926 study that raced gangs almost exclusively 
as White ethnic (Irish, Italian, German, Polish, and Lithuanian) found them to be a natural, 
interstitial feature of adolescence in predominantly poor, White ethnic enclaves. 
Participation in these gangs led, over time, to integration in mainstream, legitimized social 
institutions. See FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 
191–94 (Robert E. Park ed., 1927); see also John M. Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the Post-
Industrial Era, in 24 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 365, 369 (Michael Tonry 
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who are neither White nor proto-White.38 Instead, the contemporary gang 
is perceived as being “made up largely of darker-hued ethnic groups, 
especially African Americans and Latino Americans.”39 
The entrepreneurial and fraternal characteristics of gangs mimic 
closely the expectations of the responsibilization ethos of the liberal 
subject, “under which subjects are reconfigured as self-investors and self-
providers and are expected to take care of themselves rather than expect 
the state to do so.”40 However, as liberal subjects, gang members freely 
and autonomously choose to pursue these self-care obligations illicitly. 
The law presumes that liberal subjects face the same constellation of 
opportunities. If the opportunities are not comparable in a way that 
matters, then there is cognizable inequality that is remediable through 
accessible legal mechanisms of which the liberal subject is obliged to avail 
himself. In this analysis, the operation of race is invisible, irrelevant, and 
noncognizable. This ontological posture decontextualizes and 
dehistoricizes gangs, rendering them wholly pathological.41 
III. THE VULNERABLE SUBJECT IN A STREET GANG 
The one-dimensional popular image of the contemporary gang 
member is that of predatory drug terrorist.42 This view of street gangs 
 
& Mark H. Moore eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hagedorn, Post-Industrial Era] (listing the 
scientific studies of gang activity that Frederic Thrasher inaugurated); Louis Holland, Can 
Gang Recruitment Be Stopped? An Analysis of the Social and Legal Factors Affecting Anti-
gang Legislation, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 259, 267 (1995); James Diego Vigil, Urban Violence 
and Street Gangs, 32 ANN. REV. ANTHRO. 225, 225 (2003) [hereinafter Vigil, Urban 
Violence].  
 38. Vigil, Urban Violence, supra note 37, at 225–28.  
 39. Vigil, Urban Violence, supra note 37, at 225. The race perception of contemporary 
gangs is inconsistent with empirical data. According to a 2006 survey, fourteen percent of 
gang members are White, see MATTHEW D. O’DEANE, GANG INJUNCTIONS AND 
ABATEMENT: USING CIVIL REMEDIES TO CURB GANG-RELATED CRIMES 155 (2012), and law 
enforcement fails to categorize and treat as gangs many White gang-like organizations. See 
Brian W. Ludeke, Malibu Locals Only: “Boys Will Be Boys,” or Dangerous Street Gang? 
Why the Criminal Justice System’s Failure to Properly Identify Suburban Gangs Hurts 
Efforts to Fight Gangs, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 309, 319–20 (2007); c.f. National Youth Gang 
Survey Analysis: Demographics, NAT’L GANG CTR., 
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis/Demographics#anchorregm (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2019) (indicating that White people comprised closer to ten percent of 
gangs from 1996–2011). 
 40. Keren, supra note 30, at 6. 
 41. For the purposes of the present discussion, gang level application of the liberal 
subject as a behavioral heuristic is adequate. However, performing the same analysis with 
respect to the commonly accepted antecedents of gang membership would yield the same 
results.  
 42. Hagedorn, Postindustrial Era, supra note 37, at 366; KNOX, supra note 9, at 205. 
This paper uses the term “terrorist” generally to describe those who cause terror, without 
regard to whether they manifest the specific intent to incite fear or induce political change.   
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dominates popular legal conscious and determines prevailing approaches 
to the societal ills they represent or perpetuate. However, nearly a century 
of sustained research tracing the evolution of American gangs,43 offers a 
much more complex and nuanced understanding of their function. This 
research demonstrates that the socio-cultural, political, and economic 
functions of gangs as social actors and societal institutions is the 
promotion and creation of a particularly important category of capital 
referred to, here, as “identity property.”44 
A. The Vulnerable Subject 
Vulnerability theory is an evolving paradigm introduced by Martha 
Albertson Fineman.45 Recognizing the reality that “we are born, live, and 
die within a fragile materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible” 
to both internal and external forces beyond our control,46 its descriptive 
foundation is that this vulnerability—i.e. “the concept that we are born 
unable to protect ourselves, we become feeble with age, we must fear 
natural disasters, and our social institutions might work against us”47—is 
a fundamental and universal aspect of the human condition. 
This version of vulnerability does not describe merely human 
susceptibility to harm or danger.48 The fundamental characteristics of the 
human condition should be uncontroversial: Humans are composed of 
bone, flesh, and blood—material substances subject to the vagaries of the 
physical environment. They are animated by complex psyches that react 
 
 43. For a review of this literature, see generally KNOX, supra note 9. 
 44. This term refers to that property that implicates one’s being more fully human, as 
well as those property interests that impact one’s identity as such. For a full discussion and 
development of the concept, see Yuille, supra note 11, at 1086, 1105 n. 326.  
 45. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an 
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1718–19 (2012); Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619, 
634–35 (2013); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality 
in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, 
Anchoring Equality]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the 
Responsive State, 60 EMORY L. J. 251, 267–70 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive 
State]. For further examples of vulnerability theory, see generally VULNERABILITY: 
REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 31; 
Vulnerability and the Human Condition: Publications, EMORY UNIV., 
http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/resources/Publications.html (last vistited Dec. 14, 
2018) (collecting resources regarding vulnerability theory). 
 46. Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 45, at 9. 
 47. Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93 
N. C. L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2015); see also Michael Thomson, Bioethics & Vulnerability: 
Recasting The Objects of Ethical Concern, 67 EMORY L.J. 1207, 1219 (“It is part of our 
shared humanity that we all age and may be struck down by illness and natural or man-
made disaster.”). 
 48. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 255.  
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to internal and external phenomena. And, their lives are rooted in social, 
economic, and political institutions and relationships through which they 
manage the vocation of living.49 At birth, all humans are, in and of 
themselves, defenseless. Advanced in age, they return (to greater or lesser 
degrees) to that state. And, throughout their lives, humans are persistently 
thrust into the position of dependence because of sickness, weather, child-
bearing, child-rearing, occupational displacement, institutional transition, 
or any of an innumerable and often unpredictable amount of influences on 
human life. This natural, unavoidable, and constant susceptibility is 
vulnerability.50 As Fineman explains, 
Human vulnerability arises from our embodiment, which carries with 
it the imminent or ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and 
misfortune . . . . Bodily harm can result from the unleashing of forces 
of nature, from the mere passage of time, or from the fact that we 
humans exist in a world full of often-unpredictable material realities. 
While we can attempt to lessen risk or act to mitigate possible 
manifestations of our vulnerability, the possibility of harm cannot be 
eliminated.51 
However, people’s fragile materiality—the fundamental 
vulnerability of the human condition—is not merely a gross physical 
descriptor. Vulnerability is equally a characteristic of the human mind, 
human emotions, and human institutions. As a result of this universal and 
constant condition, all people require protection, care, and support.52 
This uncontroversial statement of the human condition 
depathologizes vulnerability, which is rhetorically associated with 
negative traits like poverty, dependence, otherness, and deficiency. As 
articulated, here, vulnerability is not a problem (though it can have 
negative or positive implications). It is not pathological. It is not a 
temporally bounded status or a state. “[H]uman vulnerability is universal 
and constant—there can be no position of invulnerability. Vulnerability IS 
the human condition.”53 This understanding challenges propensity to 
identify “vulnerable populations” as a specific and negatively stigmatized 
 
 49. Fineman describes these aspects of the human condition as embodiment and 
embeddedness. See e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable 
Inequality, 4 OSLO LAW REVIEW 133, 134 (2017) (“[A]s embodied beings, individual 
humans find themselves dependent upon, and embedded within, social relationships and 
institutions throughout the life-course.”). 
 50. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 251–75. 
 51. Id. at 267.  
 52. Dependence is most evident during periods of infancy, advanced age, and 
infirmity, which “although episodic, [are] universally experienced.” Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609, 614 (2015) 
[hereinafter Fineman, Restrained State]. 
 53. Fineman, Introducing Vulnerability, supra note 26, at 4. 
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subset of society.54 Rather, since vulnerability is a universal and constant 
condition, all people require the care and support of others. 
B. Gangs as a Product of Vulnerability 
The vulnerability framework, then, provides additional conceptual 
tools to apply to street gangs. First, in contrast to the criminological view 
of gang members as creators of vulnerability, the universality and 
constancy of vulnerability makes clear that gang members are subjects of 
vulnerability. Moreover, conceptualized as institutions of transgressive 
capital creation, gangs themselves are depathologized. They simply 
provide resources and support not otherwise available to its members. 
Gangs are largely analogous to all other societal institutions, which are 
designed to provide resources and support. 
C. Resilience as the Demand of Vulnerability Theory 
The central innovation of Fineman’s approach is that dependency is 
neither aberrant nor problematic. Dependency is not a liability. It is the 
“compelling impetus for the creation of social relationships and 
institutions.”55 The universal vulnerability of humans is what necessitates 
“the formation of families, communities, associations, and even political 
entities and nation-states.”56 At the same time, “institutions such as the 
family . . . are unable to eliminate individual vulnerability and are 
themselves  vulnerable  structures  susceptible  to  harm  and  change.”57 
The social institutions that people construct are designed to mitigate 
human vulnerability and to provide individuals with resources and support 
necessary to confront their vulnerability.58 
The inescapability of vulnerability suggests that there is no state of 
invulnerability; there is only the possibility of “resilience.”59 This 
resilience is the accumulation of sufficient resources to allow individuals 
to confront, adapt to, ameliorate, compensate for, or contain 
vulnerability.60 
 
 54. Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of 
Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 86 (2012) (“The designation of 
vulnerable (inferior) populations reinforces and valorizes the ideal liberal subject, who is 
positioned as the polar opposite of the vulnerable population. This liberal subject is thus 
constructed as invulnerable, or at least differently vulnerable, and represents the desirable 
and achievable ideals of autonomy, independence, and self-sufficiency.”).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 45, at 11.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 270. 
 60. Id. at 269–70. 
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Resilience has been defined in many ways. It is the ability to “bounce 
back” and continue to function. It is predicting, preventing, and 
minimizing the potentially disruptive consequences of vulnerability. It is 
the accumulation of sufficient resources to allow individuals to confront, 
adapt to, ameliorate, compensate for, or contain vulnerability.61 
“Resilience is perceived as necessary to both confront life’s challenges and 
to allow individuals to rise to take advantage of life’s opportunities and 
enjoyments.”62 Moreover, unlike vulnerability, resilience is not an innate 
condition.63 Instead, individuals accumulate the resources that confer 
resilience over time and within and through social institutions and 
relationships.64 Indeed, social institutions—families, communities, 
associations, and political entities and nation-states—are designed to 
mitigate human vulnerability by facilitating the accumulation of the 
resources necessary to “bounce back” from the impacts of vulnerability.65 
Thus, vulnerability theory can be framed as a social justice project 
that mandates the building of resilience. Vulnerability theory does this 
through the advancement of a “responsive state.” By continuously 
monitoring, evaluating, updating, and reforming its institutions, a 
responsive state provides and supports the institutions that help create such 
resilience.66 The responsive state must alter institutional arrangements that 
create resilience and privilege, while perpetuating disadvantage. 
Vulnerability theory also frames discourse in terms of the “deficiencies of 
institutions and the failure of state regulation rather than the deficiencies 
and failures of individuals.”67 
Unarguably, for gang members and, often, the marginalized 
communities in which they are situated, the responsive state is absent. 
Indeed, the state itself frequently serves to undermine the resilience 
mechanisms that do exist. This leads to the capital deficits that are 
correlated with gang membership and emergence. Without the sanctioned 
resilience mechanisms, street gangs fill this function. 
 
 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Jonathan Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work: A New Perspective on the 
Employment At-Will Debate, 43 SW. L. REV. 275, 301 (2013). 
 63. Id. at 301–02.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 45, at 269–70. 
 66. Id. at 274. 
 67. Fineman, LGBT Youth, supra note 16, at 311; see FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH, 
supra note 29, at 264–65 (discussing systemic political corruption stemming from the 
recalcitrance of vested interests towards disruptive programs and policies); see also 
Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 45, at 15–19.  
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IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF PROPERTY IN GANG 
RESILIENCE 
Through the lens of a vulnerable legal subject, a lack of resilience 
most often is a function of unequal access to certain societal structures 
and/or unequal allocations of privilege and power within those structures. 
This conceptual reframing moves the analysis from dichotomizing 
perpetrators and victims to recognizing gangs and their impacts on 
communities as the failure of the state or a failure of institutional support. 
A. Gangs as Capital Generators 
The interdisciplinary cohort of scholars that study gangs have 
reached a consensus that violence, criminality, and entrepreneurialism are 
secondary or tertiary undertakings of the types of gangs subject to gang 
injunctions.68 Instead, these gangs tend to fill gaps that arise due to the 
unavailability or inaccessibility of mainstream and legitimized forms of 
what Pierre Bourdieu taxonomized as economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic capital.69 
Simply put, economic capital is material wealth.70 Cultural capital is 
knowledge, skills, and cultural acquisitions (e.g. educational or technical 
qualifications.)71 Social capital is comprised of social connections, 
membership in social groups, or access to social networks.72 And, 
symbolic capital is based on one’s “prestige, authority, and so on.”73 The 
 
 68. See KNOX, supra note 9, at 636–38 (citing sources exploring gang typologies). 
 69. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 
FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 243 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986) [hereinafter 
Bourdieu, Forms of Capital]; see also Brenda C. Coughlin & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The 
Urban Street Gang After 1970, 29 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 41, 44 (2003) (citing articles creating 
a general “consensus” that identity construction is the primary function of gangs). For a 
brief intellectual history of the “plethora of capitals,” see Michael Woolcock, Social 
Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy 
Framework, 27 THEORY & SOC’Y 151, 155 & n.19, 159–61 (1998). 
 70. Bourdieu, Forms of Capital, supra note 69, at 243. 
 71. Id. Cultural capital is further differentiated into subtypes: embodied, objectified 
(e.g., physical cultural goods, like books), and institutionalized (e.g., institutional 
recognition of such capital, like diplomas). Id. For Bourdieu, the neo-classical economic 
concept of human capital most associated with Schultz (see, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz, 
Investment in Human Capital, 51 American Economic Review 1, 1-17 (1961) (identifying 
the phenomenon of human capital)) and Becker (see, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Investment in 
Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 Journal of Political Economy 9, (1962) 
(describing investment in human capital as “the imbedding of resources in people”), would 
fall within this category.  
 72. Id. at 248–49 (“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”).  
 73. Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc Wacquant, Symbolic Capital and Social Classes, 13 
Journal of Classical Sociology 292, 297 (2013). 
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particular volume and composition of capital for an actor motivates that 
actor’s actions towards particular types of goals and interests and 
facilitates “social mobility.”74 Conversely, lack of access to capital (or 
certain forms thereof) constrains the constellation of pursuits and interests 
available to the individual or group experiencing the capital deficit.75 
This brief review of Bourdieu’s capital taxonomy facilitates the 
disaggregation of the interconnected licit and illicit roles a gang plays not 
only in affected communities but also for its individual members.76 
Criminological, legal, and political literature—documenting popular legal 
consciousness—focuses on the illicit facets. For example, research 
documents the ways contemporary gangs have evolved into vehicles of 
economic capital growth by creating long-term opportunities for “financial 
mobility” in response to alienation from and demotion in legitimate labor 
markets.77 
However, extensive evidence illustrates the ways that gangs are the 
source of significant alternate cultural, social, and symbolic capital. There 
are many theories of gang development and membership that frame these 
capital contributions differently. For example, anomie or strain theory 
posits that gangs form a delinquent subculture in response to “status 
frustration” (i.e. opportunities to “succeed” as defined by mainstream 
society are unavailable).78 Social disorganization posits that gangs form 
when social institutions responsible for transmitting societal norms are 
weak.79 “Multiple marginality” theory considers gangs the outcome of 
marginalization at the multiple levels, integrating the cultural insights of 
anomie theory, the ecological insights of social disorganization theory, as 
well as key socioeconomic, historical, macrostructural, and social 
 
 74. See Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, supra note 69, at 252–55. Writing from a 
neo-Marxist perspective, Bourdieu saw the motivational power of capital as distinctly in 
line with traditional capitalist values. 
 75. See id. at 241–42.  
 76. See generally Kay Kei-Ho Pih et al., Different Strokes for Different Gangs? An 
Analysis of Capital Among Latino and Asian Gang Members, 51 SOC. PERSPECTIVES 473 
(2008) (providing a detailed discussion of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework). The 
Bordieuian construct is not directly addressed in most relevant literature, but the 
substantive insight is consistent with his capital taxonomy. 
 77. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of 
a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances, 115 Q.J. OF ECON. 755, 755–56 (2000). Moderate success 
achieved with respect to economic capital, in turn, permits gang involvement to serve as a 
substitute for acquisition of legitimized human capital through education and training. See, 
e.g., Pih et al., supra note 76, at 484–85. 
 78. See, e.g., SCOTT H. DECKER & BARRIK VAN WINKLE, LIFE IN THE GANG: FAMILIES, 
FRIENDS, AND VIOLENCE 7–8 (1996). 
 79. See, e.g., Irving A. Spergel and G. David Curry, The National Youth Gang Survey: 
A Research and Development Process, in THE GANG INTERVENTION HANDBOOK 359, 383–
86 (Arnold P. Goldstein & C. Ronald Huff eds., 1993). 
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psychological theories of gang formation.80 Complementing these 
institutional explanations, individual antecedents of gang membership are 
generally thought to include environmental and personal vulnerabilities 
like living in socially disorganized areas, weak family structures, low or 
failing educational expectations or achievement, and association with 
deviant peers or family.81 
The common insight of these viewpoints is their diagnosis of the 
disjunction between mainstream sources of capital and the alternatives 
produced by gangs.82 “Linguistic capital” provides a good example. 
Underclass youth, who participate in street gangs at higher rates than other 
youth, demonstrate deficits in their use of standard language patterns (i.e. 
speaking standard English) because they are excluded from social 
networks that value linguistic capital.83 Exclusion from social networks 
results in social capital deficits that reinforce labor market and educational 
obstacles. Those obstacles, in turn, further reduce economic and cultural 
capital. This creates cyclical obstacles to acquiring social capital.84 Gangs 
respond to these deficits by developing distinctive gang vernaculars85 that 
provide entry-level access to avenues for the acquisition of what can be 
called “gang capital,” which is capital having value in the normative 
spaces gangs create. 
The creation and exchange of gang capital is, generally, connected to 
and supported by the financial capital most gangs develop through illicit 
channels. However, the most gang capital is created and exchanged 
through expressly legal or unregulated means. A gang’s main focus is not 
the creation of financial capital; it is the provision of surrogate sources of 
identity solidarity. Such identity becomes a valuable resource because the 
gang fills gaps left by other socio-cultural institutions.86 This gap filling 
 
 80. See, e.g., James Diego Vigil, A Multiple Marginality Framework of Gangs, in THE 
MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6, at 20, 20–29.  
 81. Terence P. Thornberry et al., The Antecedents of Gang Membership, in THE 
MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6, at 30, 31–33. 
 82. James Diego Vigil, Group Processes and Street Identity: Adolescent Chicano 
Gang Members, 16 ETHOS 421, 426 (1988). 
 83. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 46–65 (John B. 
Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991). 
 84. Prudence L. Carter, ‘‘Black’’ Cultural Capital, Status Positioning, and Schooling 
Conflicts for Low-Income African American Youth, 50 SOC. PROBLEMS 136, 136–55 
(2003).  
 85. See generally RUSSELL D. FLORES, GANG SLANGING: A COLLECTION OF WORDS 
AND PHRASES USED BY GANG MEMBERS (2d ed. 1998) (detailing common gang vernacular); 
Nat’l Gang Crime Research Ctr., The Gang Dictionary: A Guide to Gang Slang, Gang 
Vocabulary, and Gang Sociolinguistic Phrases, J. GANG RES., Summer 1997, at 66 (same). 
 86. See, e.g., Deborah Lamm Weisel, The Evolution of Street Gangs: An Examination 
of Form and Variation in THE MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6 at 94-95 (describing 
the individual and group rewards associated with gang membership); Felix Padilla, The 
Working Gang in THE MODERN GANG READER, supra note 6 at 142-143 (describing the 
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results in the formation of a shared normative community (distinct from 
the mainstream normative community in which gang members are 
situated) in which alternative gang capital has purchase and cachet: 
“Gangs represent the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for 
themselves where none adequate to their needs exists.”87 
Gangs engage in a range of activities, the core function of which is 
the pursuit of identity formulation and capital creation. However, the most 
salient of those activities is gangs’ use of the colors, signs, and symbols.88 
The display of gang symbols through hand signs and unique identifying 
graffiti communicates a gang’s presence in and claim of dominance over 
a geographic space.89 The borders of a gang’s geographic territory are 
clearly charted by its distinctive graffiti.90 By deploying a gang’s 
symbols—wearing distinctive clothing and colors, physically marking 
their body with gang tattoos, incorporating gang symbols into their 
personal belongings, and adopting gang vernacular—members occupy 
space in the community’s consciousness. This performance, in turn, 
accords the gangs respect and status within the physical space to which 
they lay claim. 
Gang symbology is symbiotically connected to gang territoriality. 
Gangs create physical and psychological territories in which their identity 
has normative force. The capital associated with that identity has positive 
value. Gang territoriality itself is also a key aspect of the development of 
gang capital.91 Most gang activity is at least indirectly related to such 
territoriality. For example, gangs physically occupy public and private 
spaces in their claimed geographic territory to reinforce the symbolic 
territorial markings of graffiti.92 Within secured territories,93 gang 
members often perform traditional functions of owners. They determine 
 
development of a “gang culture” as the response to shared conditions); Beth Caldwell, 
Criminalizing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-Legal Critique of Gang Injunctions, 37 Am. J. 
Crim. L. 241, 260-62 (2010) (arguing that gangs are the product of social marginalization). 
 87. See, e.g., THRASHER, supra note 37, at 37. 
 88. KNOX, supra note 9, at 35–36; see also GOLDSTEIN & KODLUBOY, supra note 13, 
at 33–52. 
 89. GOLDSTEIN & KODLUBOY, supra note 13, at 34–40. 
 90. See generally David Ley & Roman Cybriwsky, Urban Graffiti as Territorial 
Markers, 64 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 491 (1974). 
 91. This is evidenced, for example, in by the sheer number of gangs whose names are 
related to the geographic territory they claim. Bangerter, supra note 12, at 396.  
 92. See generally, P. Jeffrey Brantingham et al., The Ecology Of Gang Territorial 
Boundaries, 50 Criminology 851 (2012); Karen L. Adams & Anne Winter, Gang Graffiti 
as a Discourse Genre, 1 Journal of Sociolinguistics 337–360 (1997). 
 93. In unstable or contested spaces, territorial claims may be enforced (or charted) 
through force. 
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access. They control markets. They perform protective functions for 
community members.94 They disaggregate, cede, and transfer their claims. 
Decentering the predatory criminality and violence with which gangs 
are associated reveals a view of gangs in which they value and desire 
access to conventional sources of capital.95 With standard avenues of 
capital acquisition obstructed, unavailable, or inaccessible, they create 
alternatives. This enriched framing of gangs grounded in available and 
accepted empirical and qualitative data, aligns with the capital deficit 
formulation advanced above and creates a link to a growing body of legal 
literature focused on human vulnerability. 
B. Property Corollaries to Vulnerability Theory 
The preceding section recast the central function of gangs as the 
production, reproduction, and protection of resilience through the 
generation of capital. This idea has clear corollaries and antecedents within 
a diverse body of property perspectives. Even though the concept has not 
been characterized in these terms, a central function of property is that the 
accumulation of property allows individuals to confront, adapt to, 
ameliorate, compensate for, or recover from the consequences of their 
vulnerability. To illustrate this idea, it serves to consider several salient 
examples. 
In The New Property,96 Charles A. Reich described property as 
“guard[ing] the troubled boundary between individual man and the 
state,”97 concluding that it facilitated the individual’s ability to control his 
own life.98 Reich’s controversial descriptive and prescriptive claims 
operationalized the idea that property cannot be understood outside of its 
social context. Property is a deliberate social construct that can be wielded 
to promote societal interests.99 
 
 94. George Knox cites gangs that have implemented litter clean up regimes, organized 
community social events, and doled out largess to incapacitated members. Knox also 
reports that host community members themselves may solicit the gang’s exercise of such 
ownership functions. KNOX, supra note 9, at 23–25, 32. 
 95. Scott H. Decker & Janet L. Lauritsen, Leaving the Gang, in THE MODERN GANG 
READER, supra note 6, at 60, 65. 
 96. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964). 
 97. Id. at 733. Reich’s definition of property aligns with the in rem/property-as-things 
definition. Id. at 739 (“A man who has property has certain legal rights with respect to an 
item of wealth.”). 
 98. Id. at 733. Reich later argued that his interest was to collapse the distinction among 
the constitutional categories of “life, liberty, and property,” which is as least implicitly a 
key insight of classical liberal thought. Id. at 771-74. 
 99. Property as a social construct has clear classical antecedents. See, e.g., DAVID A. 
SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 19 (1992) (describing Sir 
William Blackstone’s view of property as “a conventional institution created by law, habit, 
or the passage of time . . . . [The] rules prescribing its use and transfer were determined by 
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Beginning with Property and Personhood,100 Margaret Jane Radin 
asserted, “to achieve proper self-development—to be a person—an 
individual needs some control over resources in the external 
environment.”101 The purpose of property rights, then, is to secure such 
control.102 Thus, property that is “important to the freedom, identity, and 
contextuality of people”103 is a fundamental category that deserves greater 
legal protection.104 Radin explained, 
Where we can ascertain that a given property right is personal, there is 
a prima facie case that that right should be protected to some extent 
against invasion by government and against cancellation by conflicting 
fungible property claims of other people. This case is strongest where 
without the claimed protection of property as personal, the claimants’ 
opportunities to become fully developed persons in the context of our 
society would be destroyed or significantly lessened, and probably also 
where the personal property rights are claimed by individuals who are 
maintaining and expressing their group identity.105 
Eduardo Peñalver explained how property rights are fundamental to 
the constitution of communities.106 It is well established that property is a 
necessary and useful concept only in a community context. “In the world 
 
society.”); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 248 (1990) (“[P]roperty is, of all the basic rights, perhaps most 
obviously the creation of the state.”). 
 100. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
[hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood]. Though the discussion here relies primarily 
on Property and Personhood, Radin has refined, developed, and evolved her theory of 
property in a series of well-recognized articles and books. See generally Margaret Jane 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, The 
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, Liberal Conception of Property]; 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) (ebook); MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in 
Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 (1996). 
 101. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 100, at 957. 
 102. An alternative construction of that control focuses on the control of the social 
relations connected to an object—the relationship among individuals—rather than the 
particular connection a person has to the object itself. This tracks Radin’s insights from her 
distinctly in rem understanding of property to a relational understanding thereof. See Lisa 
M. Austin, Person, Place, or Thing? Property and the Structuring of Social Relations, 60 
U. TORONTO L.J. 445 (2010). This interesting alignment of Radin’s theory does not change 
its underlying import. 
 103. Radin, Liberal Conception of Property, supra note 100, at 1686. Radin calls this 
property for personhood. Id. at 1687. 
 104. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 100, at 1014–15. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally Eduardo Peñalver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 
(2005). 
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of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role.”107 However, Peñalver’s 
insight advances a different proposition: property is “an institution that 
binds individuals together into normative communities.”108 Peñalver calls 
this idea “property as entrance.”109 
The normative underpinnings of property as entrance are anchored in 
an Aristotelian community theory of property advanced by Peñalver and 
Gregory Alexander.110 That theory conceives of people as social and 
political animals inherently dependent and interdependent on other people 
to develop the uniquely “human capacities” necessary for “human 
flourishing,” 111 a rich concept that “must include at least the capacity to 
make meaningful choices among alternative life horizons.”112 That 
capacity justifies the value and effort invested in individual autonomy.113 
In the communitarian framework, property facilitates access to the human 
networks that allow an individual to become fully human.114 
Such community access, however, is mediated by the socio-cultural 
meanings attached to property.115 Among the denominative or expressive 
functions of property is its ability to signal the status of the property owner 
in the community. Nestor Davidson has explored the manifestation of this 
 
 107. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
347 (1967). 
 108. Peñalver, supra note 106, at 1972. 
 109. Id. passim. 
 110. See generally ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 
(2012) (ebook). Alexander has elaborated this concept of community. See generally 
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: 
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (2006). 
 111. Without providing an exhaustive analysis of the “well-lived life” implied by 
human flourishing, Peñalver and Alexander broadly include at least four capabilities 
necessary to the pursuit thereof: life, freedom, practical reason, and affiliation. ALEXANDER 
& PEÑALVER, supra note 110, at 89–90. 
 112. Id. at 88. They further explain the contours of “meaningful” decision-making 
within a robust conception of freedom as including both the ability to discern the “salient 
differences” among choices and “deliberate deeply” about their relative value. Id. For an 
elaboration of this idea in the property context, see generally Colin Crawford, The Social 
Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 
(2011). 
 113. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 110, at 87. 
 114. Alexander and Peñalver’s prescriptive conclusion asserts that their 
communitarian/human flourishing analysis provides a valuable heuristic for resolving 
property questions. Id. at 92–97. León Duguit’s view of property as a social function in 
service of community solidarity reaches a more rigid conclusion that property should only 
be protected where it fulfills this social function. See Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, 
The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 
1004–07 (2011). 
 115. Jeffrey Douglas Jones advances the importance of socio-cultural meaning to 
suggest that the relevant unit of analysis is the way property advances specific 
“sociocultural meanings grounded in specific object relationships” rather than property for 
personhood. Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST 
J.L. & POL’Y 93, 127–31 (2011).  
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role on several levels.116 In its thin form, the expressive function of 
property is to denote the relationship of a party to a valuable resource and/
or the relationship of several parties to each other with respect to that 
resource.117 Property’s thick expressive role is to shape and reinforce the 
economic, social, and cultural hierarchies that define mutual obligations 
and set the borders of social relations.118 The type, volume, and 
composition of an individual’s ownership situates that individual 
horizontally and vertically in the social order.119 Thus, property not only 
constitutes communities, it orders them. 
C. Property & Resilience 
None of these authors has engaged either gangs or vulnerability 
theory in the ways suggested here. However, the applicability of these 
concepts is intuitive. Like all people, gang members face acute 
institutional, economic, and physic vulnerability. Indeed, the dominant 
view is that gangs are caused by the absence or breakdown of community 
institutions (e.g. family, school, church and local government). These 
institutions transmit mainstream social norms that enable individuals to 
better respond to the consequences of their vulnerability. These norms take 
the form of capital, or resources that individuals use to facilitate either their 
acquisition of additional capital or social mobility. Thoroughly excluded 
from meaningful access to one system capital, gangs have created their 
own parallel system in which they are able not only to acquire capital that 
is valuable within that parallel system but also attempt to compel their 
admittance into the mainstream system. Gangs, then, fill an institutional 
gap by providing avenues to pursue the kinds of capital to which the gangs 
members have limited access. The accumulation of this capital, or identity 
property, lessens the risk posed by and mitigates the impact of gang 
vulnerability. 
This ability to manage the consequences of vulnerability is resilience. 
So, membership in the gang facilitates resilience. 
 
 116. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 757 (2009). 
 117. These are the alternative basic definitions of property that are often the core of the 
property theory debate. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 118. Davidson, supra note 116, at 771–74. 
 119. This function clearly correlates to the Bourdieuian idea of capital facilitating social 
mobility. See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. Davidson explores the connection 
between social mobility and property with respect to implications of stability and instability 
in the institution of property and how the law can or should be used to influence those 
implications. Davidson, supra note 116, at 807–10. 
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V. PAID INJUNCTIONS AS RESILIENCE 
The preceding discussion reframed the contemporary American 
street gang as a mechanism for the generation of resilience to which its 
members turn when mainstream or sanctioned mechanisms of resilience 
are deficient or inadequate. An important implication flows from 
renvisioning gangs in this way: If gangs generate resilience, then the tools 
that are deployed to dismantle gangs necessarily impede the development 
of that resilence. 
This part describes the basic gang injunction, an important tool that 
law enforcement has developed to respond to gangs that has resilience 
defeating consequences. Then, accepting that vulnerability theory’s 
demand for the responsive state makes this approach to gangs indefensible, 
it suggests the paid injunction as the responsive state alternative to the 
standard approach. 
A. Prevailing Anti-Gang Strategies 
The social crises that catalyzed120 the changes in street gangs that 
earned their contemporary reputation121 came at a moment in political-
economic history in which investing public resources in the underlying 
causes of the street gang problem was patently untenable.122 At the same 
historical moment, so-called “tough on crime” law enforcement models 
were proving inadequate in a legal context that had disapproved of 
 
 120. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan, The Social Organization of Drug Use and Drug 
Dealing Among Urban Gangs, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 633, 635, 661–62 (1989); Vigil, Urban 
Violence, supra note 37, at 225–242; John M. Hagedorn, Gangs as Social Actors, in THE 
ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY READER 141, 145–47 (Stuart Henry & Mark M. Lanier, eds., 
2006); Hagedorn, Post-Industrial Era, supra note 37, at 457–511; 
 121. Specifically, (1) the impact of post-industrial era in working class urban; and 
suburban minority communities, see, e.g., Sides, supra note 33, at 583–605; and (2) the 
introduction and popularization of crack cocaine, see, e.g., Jeff Grogger & Michael Willis, 
The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates, 82 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 519, 519 (2000); Janet L. Dolgin, The Law’s Response to Parental Alcohol and 
“Crack” Abuse, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1222 (1991); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the 
Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 
5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 646–47 (2000) (citing James A. Inciardi, Beyond Cocaine: 
Basuco, Crack, and Other Coca Products, 14 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 461, 482 (1987)); 
Hagedorn, Race Not Space, supra note 35, at 194–208. 
 122. That is, the contemporary political and economic priorities—which Hila Keren, 
supra note 30, now describes as neoliberalism’s responsibilization fetish—did not include 
and, in fact, expressly rejected funding non-criminal approaches to social disorder. See 
generally CHRISTOPHER PIERSON, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE? 143–52 (3rd ed. 2006) 
(providing a detailed evolution of critiques of government financial support of the health 
and well-being of poor people); Irving A. Spergel, Youth Gangs: An Essay Review, 66 SOC. 
SERV. REV. 121, 121–22 (1992)(describing central factors in the lack of political support 
for youth services and gang prevention, including fragmentation of social service labor and 
the popularity of political conservatism). 
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traditional order and maintenance policing.123 Local governments and law 
enforcement agencies have responded to the plague of gangs predictably, 
developing creative initiatives they claim disrupt or eliminate gangs. Most 
experimentation has focused on variations on traditional policing. For 
example, jurisdictions criminalized gang membership, 124 created 
specialized “gang units” within police departments, and targeted 
heightened surveillance operations against gang leaders.125 However, 
political actors also turned to civil legal mechanisms to combat the 
growing, intractable menace.126 
Chicago’s juvenile street gangs were the first to be studied 
systematically127 and remain a mine for important data on the functioning 
of contemporary gangs.128 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the most well-
known experimentation in gang control mechanisms was developed and 
deployed in Chicago. In 1992, the city passed its Gang Congregation 
Ordinance. Notwithstanding well-settled case law indicating that loitering 
statutes were unconstitutional,129 the prophylactic anti-gang loitering 
ordinance gave police broad discretion to disperse any group of two or 
more people who were in a public place “with no apparent purpose” if one 
of the individuals was “suspected” of being a gang member.130 Failure to 
 
 123. So-called “order-maintenance policing” is characterized by the broad delegation 
of discretionary power to local police to “keep the peace” (read: enforce community norms 
of decency and aesthetics) through a constellation of tools that include the informal 
exercise of authority, as well as the power to arrest individuals for relatively minor offenses 
(e.g. “breaching the peace”, “suspicion,” loitering, and vagrancy) that exist at least 
primarily to provide the police with tools to remove undesirable persons from public 
spaces. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
8 (2004); Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at Its Word: A Defense of the Use 
of Anti-Gang Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47, 51–53 (1999). But see Ryan Young, 
Sharpen the Blade: Void for Vagueness and Service of Process Concerns in Civil Gang 
Injunctions, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2009); Sides, supra note 33, at 583–60; 
David R. Truman, The Jets and Sharks are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal 
Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 686–90 (1995). 
 124. For example, California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act not 
only criminalizes gang participation, but also permits enhancements for more than thirty 
felonies when committed by a gang member. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.21, 654 (West 
2018). 
 125. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see Eva Rosen & Sudhir Venkatesh, Legal 
Innovation and the Control of Gang Behavior, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 258 (2007). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See generally THRASHER, supra note 37.  
 128. Louis Holland, Can Gang Recruitment be Stopped? An Analysis of the Social and 
Legal Factors Affecting Anti-gang Legislation, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 259, 267 (1995); 
Hagedorn, Postindustrial Era, supra note 37, at 369. 
 129. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1, 165–71 (1972) 
(declaring unconstitutionally vague a vagrancy ordinance which included loitering, defined 
as “wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or 
object.”). 
 130. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47 n.2 (1999). 
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disperse on command could result in arrest, fines up to $500, and six 
month’s imprisonment.131 The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 
ordinance in 1999;132 however, its passage and the wave of emulation it 
prompted are illustrative of local government perspectives and 
approaches.133 
Joint innovation efforts in Southern California, whose gang presence 
earned internationally notoriety during the 1980s and 1990s, resulted in a 
civil anti-gang strategy that has withstood judicial review.134 The path to 
the gang injunction began with “single situs” property abatements,135 
which are injunctions that target one parcel of private property as a 
nuisance because it serves as a gang fortress, where gang members 
congregate, deal drugs, and engage in other gang activity. Pursuant to the 
property abatement, gang members and associates are subject to stay away 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 64 (finding unconstitutionally vague an ordinance prohibiting gang members 
from loitering that failed to enumerate a comprehensive definition of “loiter” and left 
determination of gang membership to ad hoc police discretion). For a discussion of the 
mechanism at issue in Morales and relevant critiques, see generally Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Gang Loitering and Race, 91 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 99 (2000); Kim Strosnider, Anti-
Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness 
Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101 (2002); 
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A 
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197 (1998); Albert W. Alschuler 
& Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to 
Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (1998); Debra Livingston, Gang 
Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 162 
(1999). The U.S. Supreme Court has not considered gang injunctions, but, as imposed in 
California, it is clear that they are distinguishable from the Chicago ordinance with respect 
to the constitutional infirmities considered in Morales. See Walston, supra note 123, at 51–
53. But see Young, supra note 123, at 1004. 
 133. See generally Meares & Kahan, supra note 132 (primarily discussing anti-gang 
ordinances, but drawing connections among other strategies, including gang injunctions); 
Strosnider, supra note 132. 
 134. The future viability of the gang injunction is not clear, as several municipalities 
have experienced significant community resistance to their deployment. Civil rights 
organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, continue to challenge the 
mechanisms as unconstitutional. At least partially in response to such criticism, in 2017, 
the city of Los Angeles removed more than two thousand individuals from its various gang 
injunctions. James Queally, Thousands freed from L.A. gang injunctions that controlled 
their movements, friendships, even dress choices, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://lat.ms/2QPCA2U. 
 135. Cheryl L. Maxson, Karen Hennigan, David Sloane & Kathy A. Kolnick, Can Civil 
Gang Injunctions Change Communities? A Community Assessment Of The Impact Of Civil 
Gang Injunctions 3 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 208345.pdf (citing 
Deanne Castorena, The History Of The Gang Injunction In California (1998) (unpublished 
report by the Hardcore Gang Division, Office of the District Attorney, County of Los 
Angeles)). The program in place in Southern California is described in Jonathan Cristall & 
Liora Forman-Echols, Property Abatements–The Other Gange Injunction: Project 
T.O.U.G.H., NAT’L GANG CTR. BULL. (Sept. 2009), https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/ 
content/documents/project-tough.pdf. 
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orders prohibiting them from returning to the property, while owners, 
tenants and managers are required to take comprehensive action to prevent 
gang activity.136 If the nuisance is not abated, the property may be seized 
and sold.137 
Within a decade, single situs abatements had given way to the much 
broader injunctive relief afforded by the gang injunction.138 This 
distinctive feature of the gang prevention and criminal law enforcement 
arsenal takes the form of a standard injunction.139 In their standard form, 
gang injunctions claim that the conduct of named gangs, as unincorporated 
entities—not specific individuals140—constitutes a public nuisance under 
California law, which has both civil and penal components.141 As a civil 
offense, “[a]nything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as 
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property” constitutes 
a nuisance.142 A nuisance becomes public when it “affects at the same time 
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of 
persons,”143 and it becomes criminal when it has a distinctively public 
quality.144 The broad nuisance abatement actions have been deployed 
 
 136. For example, the owner may be required to install security systems or make 
physical alterations to the property (like increasing lighting or installing fences) to prevent 
gang activity and, in leased property, implement changes to management, tenant-screening 
proceedings. If necessary, tenant evictions may be ordered.  
 137. Jonathan Cristall & Liora Forman-Echols, Property Abatements–The Other 
Gange Injunction: Project T.O.U.G.H., NAT’L GANG CTR. BULL. 4–6, 10–12 (Sept. 2009), 
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/content/documents/project-tough.pdf. The technical 
process of property abatement is more complicated, and sale and seizure is a remedy of last 
resort, that follows the closure of the property and imposition of liens, and other 
intermediate sanctions designed to incentivize abatement. 
 138. O’DEANE, supra note 39, at 441–49.  
 139. Cheryl L. Maxson et al., For the Sake of the Neighborhood? Civil Gang Injunction 
as a Gang Intervention Tool in Southern California, in POLICING GANGS AND YOUTH 
VIOLENCE 239, 245–49, 260–62 (Scott H. Decker ed., 2003) [hereinafter Maxson et al., 
Sake of the Neighborhood] (detailing the ways the mechanism defies simple categorization 
in the gang intervention typology proposed by Spergel and Curry, supra note 79). 
 140. A key component of gang injunctions is their reliance on California’s “time-
honored equitable practice applicable to labor unions, abortion protestors or other 
identifiable groups” of pursuing equitable remedies against identifiable groups (regardless 
of their incorporation status) because “such groups can act only through the medium of 
their membership.” To effect this principle, at least some specific gang members are named 
as representatives of the named gang. Then, the gang, through those representatives (and 
other gang member who steps forward to speak for the gang), is given the opportunity to 
challenge the injunction, generally, and its particular provisions, specifically, according to 
procedures applicable to any other civil injunction. The named gang members may also 
challenge their inclusion in the proposed injunction. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 
P.2d 596, 617 (Cal. 1997). 
 141. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479–3480 (West 2018).  
 142. Id. § 3479 (specifically including drug dealing). 
 143. Id. § 3480. 
 144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 2018). 
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against gangs to target conduct not otherwise prohibited in California 
Penal Code, 145 and the broad definition was crafted to flexibly cover the 
full range of behaviors in which gang members might engage publicly. In 
addition to unlawful and criminal conduct, gang injunctions typically 
enjoin: 
(1) standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering, bicycling or 
otherwise appear in the public view with any known gang 
member; 
(2) possessing tools or objects “capable” of defacing real or personal 
property (i.e. pens); 
(3) blocking the free passage of any person or vehicle; 
(4) confronting, intimidating, harassing, annoying, provoking any 
residents or patrons or visitors to the target area;146 
(5) knowingly being present in a vehicle found to have contraband, 
drugs or illegal weapons;147 
(6) acting as a lookout and signaling in any manner to other persons 
the approach of the police; 
(7) using words, phrases, physical gestures or symbols (i.e. gang 
signs), or engaging in other forms of communication that describe 
or refer to the gang; 
(8) wearing gang clothes; and 
(9) making loud noise of any kind, including yelling or loud music, at 
any time of day or night.148  
Gang injunctions have been deployed with considerable variation.149 
Some jurisdictions use injunctions to reduce the number of gang members 
on the street at any given moment by performing gang sweeps.150 Other 
jurisdictions report that police officers “get more mileage from the gang 
 
 145. EDWARD L. ALLAN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF POLICING BY INJUNCTION 63 (2004). 
 146. Notice that since these are civil actions, many provisions, like this one, require no 
mens rea. Id. at 71. 
 147. LOS ANGELES CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE: CRIMINAL AND SPECIAL LITIGATION 
BRANCH, GANG INJUNCTION GUIDELINES (2007) at 27 http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-
library/resource_1317.pdf.  
 148. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 617 (Cal. 1997). 
 149. See, e.g. Management Audit of the Civil Gang Injunctions, in 2003–2004 LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 223–24 (2004), 
http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/gjury03-04/LACGJFR_03-04.pdf (describing differential 
deployment between the city and county of Los Angeles). 
 150. See O’DEANE, supra note 39, at 71 (describing the systematic “catch and release” 
of gang members). 
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injunctions by using them as a negotiating tool to gain information on the 
streets.”151 Gang injunctions also impose indirect but significant practical 
consequences on injunctees that are unrelated to the enforcement of the 
gang injunction. Being enjoined, for example, is included on a standard 
background check,152 which limits injunctees’ access to legitimate 
employment and both public and private housing. 
Gang injunctions are intuitively compelling. They are responsive to 
the characteristics of the historical moment in which they arose that 
rendered conventional law enforcement strategies impracticable and 
relatively cost effective. Further, the savings associated with them are 
reinforced by the heightened community surveillance that gang 
injunctions permit. Moreover, proponents claim, this heightened 
surveillance creates deterrent reverberations at no additional enforcement 
cost. Through that heightened surveillance, which is explicitly sanctioned 
for injunctees and implicitly supported for the wider safety zone 
population, law enforcement is able to bypass much of the constitutional 
criminal procedural strictures and redeploy the flexibility and discretion to 
strategically target delinquent youth for the types of behavior that was the 
object of historical order-maintenance policy.153 Gang injunctions are also 
responsive to the “tough on crime” political climate by communicating 
absolute intolerance for gangs and by narrowly circumscribing the liberty 
of perceived criminals.154 
The gang injunction example is apt for the present discussion. 
However, the full range of traditional law enforcement techniques and 
special initiatives that reflect popular legal consciousness centers on gangs 
as wholly criminal institutions engaged in terminally violent conduct to 
advance financial objectives. The force of this perspective can be seen in 
the response to legal challenges to these types of innovations. The 
successful challenge to Chicago’s gang loitering ordinance rested on its 
focus on loitering, which is by definition an innocuous act and by 
implication not a tool of gang terrorists.155 
In contrast, California-style gang injunctions survive First 
Amendment challenges because the expression and association of gangs 
has the illicit purpose of furthering a criminal enterprise, which falls into 
the constitutionally unprotected category of behaviors that do not express 
some political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultural 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Lindsay Crawford, Comment, No Way Out: An Analysis of Exit Processes for 
Gang Injunctions, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 161, 179–80 (2009). 
 153. See Walston, supra note 123, at 51. 
 154. See id. at 53. 
 155. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 50 (1999). 
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viewpoint and which are not conferred First Amendment protection.156 
Gang association and speech is criminal association and speech. 
The Equal Protection clause of the Constitution prohibits invidious 
distinction based on protected characteristics, like race. Challenges to 
gang injunctions on this ground are untenable because gangs expressly 
enjoined because of their proven record of causing criminal public 
nuisances, not because of their race or status.157 Again, definitionally, 
gangs are criminal.158 
At least with respect to gang members, then, the gang injunction 
should be expected to heighten the risks posed by and exacerbate the 
impact of vulnerability. Gang injunction assessments have born out this 
expectation. Beth Caldwell concluded that injunctions reinforce gang 
membership by exacerbating key marginality indicators across different 
scales.159 That is, gang injunctions render injunctees less able to access 
mainstream, legitimized mechanisms of resilience, like lawful 
employment. Similarly, Joan Howarth demonstrates that gang injunctions 
distinguish antagonistic categories of gang members versus community 
members, which are completely separated and in opposition. These silohs, 
in turn, solidify gang exclusion from the community.160 For both Caldwell 
and Howarth, gang injunctions excise actual and suspected gang members 
from communities in ways that further destabilize mainstream resilience 
development and distribution,161 while the concomitant heightened 
community surveillance perpetuates rather than undermines social 
influence factors that contribute to gang emergence.162 
B. Paid Injunctions 
This article maintains that street gangs are best understood as 
engaged in transgressive property creation and reinterpretation that 
 
 156. Walston, supra note 123, at 69. 
 157. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, 
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2004); O’DEANE, supra note 39, at 157–58. 
 158. See also 2015 NATIONAL GANG REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (defining street gangs 
as “criminal organizations that formed on the street and operate in neighborhoods”). 
 159. Beth Caldwell, Criminalizing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-Legal Critique of Gang 
Injunctions, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241, 262-70 (2010). 
 160. Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice 
Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 734-
36 (2000).  
 161. In the general criminal context, Meares has problematized the tendency of 
incarceration to produce the same results. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 699 (1998); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug 
Law Enforcement, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 191, 223-26 (1998). 
 162. Terence R. Boga, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for 
Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 477, 460-61 (1993). 
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provides alternative sources of resilience both to gang members and, often, 
to the communities in which gangs are sited. It would be possible to take 
this recasting of street gangs using the vulnerability heuristic as an 
opportunity to reject the consensus that gangs are bad. However, this 
article follows a less radical path. 
[W]hen vulnerability is understood as a universal constant, the 
question is not, “Who is more or less vulnerable?” – because again, we 
are all vulnerable. The question instead becomes, “Who is more or less 
resilient and how did they get that way?” Understanding this inequality 
of resilience is at the heart of vulnerability theory, because it is through 
social institutions . . . that we develop our resilience over the course of 
our lives. Through the lens of the liberal legal subject, a lack of 
resilience can be deemed an individual failing. You made a mistake . . . 
. But through the lens of a vulnerable legal subject, a lack of resilience 
most often is a function of unequal access to certain societal structures 
and/or unequal allocations of privilege and power within those 
structures.163 
Thus, even accepting the proposition that gangs are bad, what this 
reframing should mean for an anti-gang strategy remains a relevant 
inquiry. 
As sketched above, gang injunctions prohibit members of specified 
gangs from engaging in a wide range of otherwise lawful activities through 
which gangs generate the property interests that provide resilience to 
gangs. So, wearing clothes in gang colors, appearing in public with a gang 
member, carrying a writing utensil, and many other acts are prohibited and 
effectively criminalized by gang injunctions.164 Recall, the antecedents to 
gang membership and the situs of gangs is linked to the inadequacy of 
traditional mechanisms for building resilience for gang members and the 
communities in which they live.165 Gangs confer on their members both 
privilege and power. They do this through the deployment, use, and even 
creation of identity property—wearing their colors, claiming territory, and 
displaying gang symbols. 
Gang injunctions follow, systematically dismantling gangs and 
stripping gang members of the resilience fostered by the gang and to which 
the state has failed to provide access. That gang injunctions decrease 
resilience can be inferred from available empirical analyses of gang 
 
 163. Stu Marvel, Vulnerability Theory and Sexual Assault on Campus (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author); see generally Stu Marvel, Response to Tuerkheimer – 
Rape on and off Campus, The Vulnerable Subject of Rape Law: Rethinking Agency and 
Consent, 65 EMORY L. J. 2035 (2016) (providing support for quoted material). 
 164. See supra notes 138 to 152 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra notes 159 to 162 and accompanying text. 
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injunctions.166 Qualitative research suggests that gang injunctions also 
strip non-member inhabitants of gang territory of resilience.167 
Using a vulnerability lens, through which the obligation of the state 
is to support the development of resilience, rather than strip or impede it, 
there is no defense of the gang injunction as it has been typically advanced. 
As a social justice project that mandates the building of resilience, 
vulnerability theory demands an alternative to gang injunctions. It requires 
the state to destabilize (or destroy) one mechanism of resilience, while 
replacing it with other mechanisms of resilience that provide a “better” 
package of resources and relationships. 
One such alternative is the compensated gang injunction.168 This 
legal tool—by which the restrictions imposed by gang injunctions are 
extracted only upon compensation—can diminish the collateral 
criminality of gangs, while opening access to mainstream sources of 
resilience.  In such a model, local governments obtain injunctions against 
a named street gang, specifying gang-related behavior that has created a 
nuisance within the jurisdiction.169 In exchange for the injunction, 
however, the local government is required to compensate the injunctees. 
Simple monetary compensation would be largely consistent with the 
claims developed above. Financial capital provides access to almost the 
full range of resilience mechanisms contemplated within vulnerability and 
property discourse, and from which the scholarly consensus suggests, 
gang members are excluded. The one reported case that employed a 
compensated injunction170 (and each of the three subsequent elaborations 
thereof)171 contemplated monetary relief. Compensation in-kind, which is 
the core of the paid gang injunction model advocated here, is more 
consistent with those perspectives. It also more pragmatic.172 So, in 
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exchange for refraining from gang activity pursuant to the injunction, 
enjoined gang members would be offered pathways into the mainstream 
capital and property system from which they are marginalized and to 
which they have built an alternative. The idea of compensating individuals 
to engage in desirable behaviors is wholly consistent with the economic 
structures and foundations of many societies, and it has proven successful 
in many areas where such commodification is originally interpreted 
unfavorably. 
For example, gaining increasing attention within the fields of 
development and poverty economics are “conditional cash transfer” 
programs in which government largesse is earned through attending 
school, receiving vaccinations, or partaking in job training programs.173 
Empirical and qualitative studies of these programs implemented in many 
countries have concluded they are largely successful.174 
The key features of a “service” model of compensation for reducing 
gangs have also already been implemented in the work of various 
institutions and organizations. In exchange for a commitment to remain 
uninvolved in gang activity, these organizations’ constituents gain access 
to a menu of capital producing services, including job training, education, 
employment or employment counseling, mental health services, life 
counseling, tattoo removal, and legal services.175 
For example, the city of Richmond, California, has experimented 
with the key conceptual features of a paid gang injunction. Through its the 
Operation Peacemaker Fellowship,176 the city’s Office of Neighborhood 
Services began a street outreach program to identify youth, aged 16-25, 
responsible for violent crime in the city.177 Those youth were then offered 
a fellowship in which they received counseling, social services, a job, 
opportunities to travel, and up to a $1,000 a month for nine months in 
exchange for developing a “life map,” staying in contact with the program 
every day, and refraining from criminal activity.178 The program has 
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received significant media attention because of its cash payments, but its 
success remains untested.179 International implementation of a program, 
with some of the conceptual features of the paid gang injunction, is also 
untested. In 2014, the English coffee company, Kenco, launched “Coffee 
vs. Gangs.”180 The very well publicized program181 offers Hondurans, aged 
16 to 28, a training course taught by agricultural and business experts 
designed to help them become independent coffee farmers in Honduras’ 
burgeoning coffee industry.182 
Presaging the Richmond and Kenco experiments, Los Angeles’ 
Homeboy Industries is the longest-running, most well-known, and 
successful anti-gang compensation initiative.183 The organization, which 
is also the nation’s largest gang intervention and reintegration program, 
targets former gang members with the most barriers to mainstream 
employment, including extensive and visible tattoos, mental health 
impediments, and significant or recent felony records.184 Upon acceptance 
to the program, the individual is assigned a case manager with whom he 
develops a service plan that reflects the gang member’s objectives and the 
services in which he will participate to accomplish them.185 Depending on 
the incoming skill level of the individual, he may receive a remunerated 
job-training position in one of Homeboy Industries economic enterprises 
with employers willing to hire Homeboy Industries’ difficult-to-employ 
population.186 During their participation in the program, which is targeted 
to last approximately eighteen months, participants also receive free social 
services, including tattoo removal, parenting classes, high school 
equivalency preparation, substance abuse counseling, clinical and group 
mental health programming, language and life coaching, and legal 
assistance.187 
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Homeboy Industries reports that two-thirds of its “clients/trainees” 
transition into full-time, mainstream employment,188 and disassociate with 
at least the criminogenic element of gangs. Existing research indicates that 
full-time, legitimate employment at any income level is associated with 
decreases in and cessation of active gang involvement.189 Individuals may 
continue to identify with a gang, but they reduce or stop their engagement 
in criminal, tortfeasing, and otherwise objectionable gang conduct that is 
the overarching concern of host communities. That evidence is supported 
by anecdotal reports that gang members profess a desire and willingness 
to refrain from entrepreneurial gang activity when comparable legitimate 
economic activities are available. Since economic analyses of gang 
finances indicate that the average gang member can earn no more than 
$20,000 annually from gang-associated economic activities,190 licit 
employment at this approximate income level is expected to result in the 
termination of the types of gang conduct with which gang injunctions are 
concerned, as well as the associated criminal conduct. 
The operation of Homeboy Industries also appears responsive to the 
enriched understanding of gangs advanced here and to the demands of 
vulnerability theory. Rather than further marginalizing gang members 
from mainstream markets, Homeboy Industries attempts to fill the same 
economic, social, and cultural capital gaps that generate gangs and create 
a bridge to mainstream networks and identity property access for its 
service population. By engaging gang members with respect to the value 
of their property, the process becomes community-affirming. Instead of 
delegitimizing everything about the gang member, the community can 
acknowledge the settlements gangs have made with respect to their 
interests, and then give them a fundamental role in determining how to 
accommodate or dispose of those interest in light of countervailing 
community interests. 
This article claims that the acquisition of resilience fostering identity 
property through the means available to an individual, even if unlawful, is 
not necessarily a moral failing of that individual.191 Instead, it is part of the 
natural propensity or necessity to pursue identity property as a means to 
confront one’s vulnerability. This claim is buttressed by the fact that 
successful participants use their access to mainstream capital to pursue 
traditional avenues of identity property. 
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Both theoretical and practical evaluations indicate that a 
compensated gang injunction is a feasible and desirable alternative to the 
gang injunction model of gang intervention and re-integration. That is, the 
proposal remedies an observed exclusion from sanctioned social 
institutions that promote the accumulation of capital that foster resilience. 
However, they do nothing to prevent the capital deficits that result in gang 
formation. Vulnerability theory and its demand for a responsive state that 
affirmatively works to build and support social institutions that act as 
resilience mechanisms requires such a comprehensive anti-gang strategy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
On its surface, this article is about street gangs, which occupy a 
uniquely vilified position in American popular consciousness. 
Notwithstanding the availability of a rich body of sociological, 
criminological, and legal literature concerned with issues at the center and 
in the penumbra of the phenomena, often ostensibly aimed at harnessing 
intellectual and emotional sympathy, the members of gangs remain an 
almost universally disdained population. Such aversion has impelled a 
criminological approach to gangs that ignores their fundamental role. 
In contrast, this article recognized that gangs are, essentially, 
networked institutions of resilience that arise within alternative markets, 
where mainstream institutions and systems have failed to provide 
opportunities to create enough identity property to adequately inure gang 
members and their communities to their vulnerability. Then, it suggested 
that the paid injunction constitutes an appropriate satisfaction of the 
responsive state’s duty to provide gang members with the assets or tools 
to be resilient when their vulnerability is made manifest. 
In telling its street gang story, the article illustrates the central role of 
property in the concept of resilience. Resilience is the accumulation of 
resources that permit individuals to cope with their vulnerability. This 
idea—that the accumulation of resources (i.e. capital or property) allows 
people to cope with their vulnerability—is central to a broad range of 
property justifications. 
In its interstices, this article develops some more broadly applicable 
lessons. The vulnerability lens permits a deeper and more authentic 
understanding of how people engage with each other and their 
communities. While vulnerability is inextricable from the human 
condition, so too is the universality and constancy of the human endeavor 
to mitigate vulnerability. Gangs may be engaged in transgressive behavior, 
but they are not pathological. They are responsive to need to build 
mechanisms of resilience where few or none exist. This idea also flows 
directly from numerous property perspectives. For example, property as 
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freedom, property as personhood, property as entrance, property as 
relative status—from any of these perspectives, what gangs do is create 
sophisticated networks to respond to vulnerability faced by gang members. 
What vulnerability theory adds to these varied contributions is its 
demand for a responsive state. Even communitarian property perspectives 
recognize property’s commitment to stability, immobility, and stasis192—
”reflexively resistant to change, preserving as it does the realm of settled 
expectation.”193 The responsive state’s affirmative obligations open new 
appropriate avenues for state intervention. 
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